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Abstract—Self-sovereign identity is a new identity management
paradigm that allows entities to really have the ownership
of their identity data and control their use without involving
any intermediary. Blockchain is an enabling technology for
building self-sovereign identity systems by providing a neutral
and trustable storage and computing infrastructure and can be
viewed as a component of the systems. Both blockchain and self-
sovereign identity are emerging technologies which could present
a steep learning curve for architects. We collect and propose
12 design patterns for blockchain-based self-sovereign identity
systems to help the architects understand and easily apply the
concepts in system design. Based on the lifecycles of three main
objects involved in self-sovereign identity, we categorise the pat-
terns into three groups: key management patterns, decentralised
identifier management patterns, and credential design patterns.
The proposed patterns provide a systematic and holistic guide
for architects to design the architecture of blockchain-based self-
sovereign identity systems.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Self-sovereign Identity, Pattern, Ar-
chitecture, Identity Management
I. INTRODUCTION
A legal entity’s identity (i.e., an individual or an organisa-
tion) can be represented using a set of attributes [1] associated
with the entity (such as name and address). Identity manage-
ment includes maintaining the identity data and their access
control. Fig. 1 depicts a conceptual overview of the main roles
and their relationships in identity management. Specifically,
an entity who registers an identifier in a particular system
is considered as a holder (e.g. legal individual / organisation
name) of the identity data (e.g. date of birth, and role within
the organisation) associated with the identifier, while all the
identity data of the holder are stored with an issuer (e.g. a
government agency). Note that the holder of an identifier can
sometimes also be an issuer to identify itself. A credential is
a verifiable claim, which includes some facts that is attested
and digitally signed by the issuer about the holder [2]. The
fact in a credential can be the holder’s identity data (e.g. date
of birth) or other types of factual data (e.g. a GPA). After
Qinghua Lu is the corresponding author.
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Fig. 1. Identity management overview
establishing a trust relationship with an issuer, anyone can be
a verifier (e.g. an employer) of a claim. A verifier requests
for a specific credential (e.g. birth certificate of a person), and
verifies the validity of the credential via the issuer’s signature.
Identity management is challenging if holders do not have
a full control over their identity data, since the data are usu-
ally maintained at third-party issuers’ sites (e.g., government
agency). An issuer may disclose identity data to a third-party
without the holder’s knowledge. Furthermore, the issuer may
be compromised, consequently resulting in identity informa-
tion leakage (e.g., Aadhaar data leakage [3]). In addition,
current credential verification processes are usually complex,
costly and time consuming (e.g., taking weeks for verifying
a degree). It is also possible that a significant process incon-
sistency occurs within current identity management systems
as individuals must seek to verify (and re-verify) identities at
multiple points with different service providers1.
The concept of self-sovereign identity allows holders to
retain ownership of their identities and control over how their
identity data is used [1]. Such a notion is increasingly popular,
particularly in our digitised and privacy-sensitive society.
However, for legal identities in the real world, we argue that
self-sovereign identity does not mean holders can control all
1http://fsi.gov.au/publications/final-report/
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aspects of their identity that are maintained by the issuers.
For example, holders are not able to include any additional
information in their identity information (e.g., a name other
than their legal name in their academic transcript), or remove
existing restrictions imposed upon registration. Rather, what
is achievable via self-sovereign identity is that holders can
control the use of their identity data without involving any
intermediary [1]. For example, through an effective implemen-
tation of a digital wallet for self-sovereign identity to store
and manage credentials, holders who own several identifiers
can choose to present any credentials associated with any of
the identifiers to verifiers, without having to go through the
issuers.
Blockchain is an innovative distributed ledger technology
(DLT) for building new forms of decentralised software ar-
chitecture, which enables agreements on transactional data
sharing across a large network of untrusted participants,
without relying on a central trusted authority [4]. Identity
management is considered to be one of the most innovative
applications of blockchain technology [5], as blockchain can
be used to build an infrastructure or ecosystem to realise self-
sovereign identity, where no intermediary is needed. Many
organisations (e.g., start-ups, enterprises, and governments) are
currently exploring how to leverage blockchain technology to
implement self-sovereign identity solutions, examples include
uPort2 and Hyperledger Indy3. However, as blockchain and
self-sovereign identity are both emerging technologies with
limited documentation, there can be a steep learning curve
for developers to design the architecture of blockchain-based
self-sovereign identity systems. A recent survey by Gartner
[6] points to the current gap and scarcity of blockchain skills
in the market. Having a systematic and holistic guidance
for the architectural design of blockchain-based self-sovereign
identity systems can assist system architects and developers.
In this regard, this paper presents 12 design patterns for
the design of blockchain-based self-sovereign identity appli-
cations. To correctly capture the use of the identities and
associated credentials, we analysed the lifecycles of the three
key objects in self-sovereign identity (i.e., key, identifier,
and credential), and classified the patterns into three groups
accordingly: key management patterns, decentralised identifier
management patterns, and credential design patterns. The
proposed patterns are connected to different state transitions in
the lifecyles of the three key objects, which provides a guide
to the architects and developers when the design patterns can
be effectively used.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
Section II discusses related work. Section III presents the
design patterns of blockchain-based self-sovereign identity
applications with the extended pattern form in [7]. Section IV
concludes the paper.
2https://www.uport.me/
3https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/hyperledger-indy
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Blockchain and Smart Contracts
Blockchain is an emerging paradigm of building next gen-
eration applications in a decentralised way, with two core
technologies: 1) a distributed ledger, and 2) a computing
infrastructure.
The distributed ledger maintained in a blockchain network
can verify and store transactions [4], without relying on any
central trusted authority, while all participating nodes need to
reach consensus on transactional data states to achieve trust. In
the consensus mechanism proposed by Nakamoto, an honest
majority of nodes is assumed, achieving trust without a third
party intermediary through game theoretic incentives [8]. The
data structure of blockchain is a list of identifiable blocks, and
all the blocks are linked to the previous block and thus form
a chain. The blocks are containers for storing transactions,
which are identifiable packages carrying the changing states
of data.
Blockchain provides a programmable computing infrastruc-
ture via smart contracts, which are essentially the programs
deployed and run on blockchain [9]. Smart contracts can
express triggers, conditions to enable complex business logic.
Ethereum is currently the most widely-used blockchain that
supports Turing-complete smart contracts. The primary smart
contract language used on Ethereum blockchain is Solidity4.
Integrating blockchain technology into current software
architecture brings both quality improvements and also
blockchain’s nature limitations. For instance, immutability and
transparency can ensure data integrity, while the underlying
decentralisation enhances the availability of whole system.
Nevertheless, data privacy and scalability are the main two
limitations of public blockchains. Data privacy on public
blockchain is limited because there is no privileged user,
and every participant can join the network to access all
the information on blockchain and validate new transactions.
There are scalability limits on (i) the size of the data on
blockchain, (ii) the transaction processing rate, and (iii) the
latency of data transmission and commits, which is affected
by the chosen consensus protocol. Furthermore, the number
of transactions included in each block is also limited by the
bandwidth of nodes participating in the network.
B. Self-Sovereign Identity
Identity management is a fundamental requirement in our
digitised society, since every entity is likely to have multiple
identities for different people or organisations [10], [11].
However, Internet users do not generally have complete control
over their digital identities stored by third-party issuers (e.g.
social networking sites or employers), which may disclose
one’s identity information to others without their permission
and/or knowledge.
In self-sovereign identity [1], identity owners are central
to the administration of the identities, in the sense that
they are able to manage their identities on personal mobile
4https://solidity.readthedocs.io/
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Fig. 2. Lifecycles of three main objects in self-sovereign identity
devices or cloud, and interact with multiple service providers.
To implement self-sovereign identity, the W3C Community
Group specifies a standard for decentralised identifier (DID)
[12], which contains human-readable information and can
be used across different platforms. A DID is a URL that
refers to an entity for trusted interactions. Each DID bonds
to a DID document (DDO) which describes how to use the
specific DID through some given properties, such as context,
id, public key, and service endpoint. context expresses the
system environment for information exchange between two
DIDs; id is the DID described by this DDO; publicKey is for
digital signatures and cryptographic operations; and service
denotes service endpoints used for interactions among DIDs.
A DID and its corresponding DDO do not contain any identity
data which are stored in personal devices or database owned by
the identity service providers. A credential [2] is a verifiable
claim, carrying particular identity information attributes that
an issuer provides to attest to some specific characteristics of
an entity. Within self-sovereign identity, entities are able to
issue digitally-signed credentials about themselves and others
linked to their DIDs, and these credentials can be verified
by anyone else. Blockchain has been widely recognised as a
viable technology for enabling DID in terms of data integrity
and privacy. As self-sovereign identity needs no intermediary,
it aligns with the design nature of blockchain which eliminates
the need for a centralised authority.
C. Related Work
Previous works have characterised and applied design pat-
terns for smart contract and blockchain applications [13],
[14]. originChain [15], [16] adopts design patterns for data
management and smart contract design to improve the system
adaptability. uBaaS encapsulates design patterns as services
to facilitate the development of blockchain-based applications
[17]. Bartoletti and Pompianu [18] conduct an empirical
analysis of smart contracts, in which they collected hundreds
of smart contracts and divided them into nine categories:
token, authorisation, oracle, randomness, poll, time constraint,
termination, math and fork check. Eberhardt and Tai [19]
propose five patterns, including challenge response pattern,
off-chain signatures pattern, content-addressable storage pat-
tern, delegated computation pattern, and low contract footprint
pattern, mainly focusing on the separation of on-chain and
off-chain for data and computation. Zhang et al. [20] share
the experience of designing a blockchain-based healthcare
platform, to which they apply four object-oriented software
patterns to improve the application scalability. Wohrer and
Zdun [21] collect six design patterns to address security issues
of smart contract design.
There have been significant efforts in both industry and
academia to address many of the identity management chal-
lenges using blockchain technology [22], [23]. Many organ-
isations and companies have been developing self-sovereign
TABLE I
PATTERN COLLECTION OVERVIEW
Category Name Summary
Key
Management
Patterns
Master & Sub Key Each entity has a master-key for managing sub-keys which are used for signing transactions for different identityaccounts.
Hot & Cold Wallet
Storage An entity can maintain a hot wallet connecting to internet and a cold wallet which is kept offline.
Key Sharding A key can be split up into several different pieces, and restored using enough key pieces.
DID
Management
Patterns
Identifier Registry The identifier registry maintains bindings between an identifier and the address of an identity attribute.
Multiple Registration Each entity can register a unique identifier for each relationship.
Bound with Social
Media A bidirectional binding is established between social media profile and blockchain-based identity.
Dual Resolution To establish interactions, two entities can mutually acquire each other’s DDO for verification and communicationinformation.
Update by Delegates Each identifier maintains a list of delegates that can help the user recover the identity.
Credential
Design
Patterns
Selective Content
Generation
An issuer generates a customised credential according to a holders specific requirements about credential contents.
Time-Constrained
Access A holder can share a link which is redirected to the credential content only for a specified period of time.
One-Off Access A holder can share a one-off link which is redirected to the credential content one time only to satisfy a temporaryidentification request.
Anchoring to
Blockchain Periodically sending the unique hash value of off-chain data to blockchain.
identity platforms using blockchain, including Sovrin (Hy-
perledger Indy) [24], uPort (Ethereum) [25], and Blockstack
(Namecoin) [26]. Decentralised Identity Foundation5 aims to
develop an open ecosystem for decentralised identity, and the
Internet Identity Workshop6 seeks to find, investigate, and
solve identity issues. There are also projects designing and
developing self-sovereign identity systems [27]–[31].
Compared with the existing works, our study focuses on
the design patterns of blockchain-based self-sovereign iden-
tity, aiming to facilitate the design and development of self-
sovereign identity applications. Some collected patterns are
already applied in the related works, for instance, Identifier
Registry, Multiple Registration, and Selective Content Gener-
ation can be found in the above projects and studies.
III. PATTERNS FOR BLOCKCHAIN-BASED
SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY
This section introduces 12 patterns for the design of
blockchain-based self-sovereign identity applications. We
present the patterns in three groups: key management, DID
management and credential design. The patterns aim to make
better use of three main objects in self-sovereign identity –
key, DID, and identity credential, by understanding their use
in different stages of the lifecycles.
Fig. 2 and Table I offer an overview of these patterns, while
Fig. 3 gives a glimpse of the relations between the patterns
collected in this study. We describe each pattern using the
extended pattern form in [7]. This includes the pattern name,
a short summary, the usage context, the problem statement, a
5https://identity.foundation/
6https://internetidentityworkshop.com/
discussion on the forces leading to the problem difficulty, the
solution and its consequences, and some examples of real-
world known uses of the pattern. Note that the forces are
identified with the quality attributes which may affect the
application, and the solution sometimes proposes a trade-off
to mitigate the dilemma.
A. Key Management Patterns
1) Master & Sub Key:
Summary: Each entity has a master-key for managing sub-
keys which are used to sign transactions for different identity
accounts. Fig. 4 is a graphical representation of the pattern.
Context: Public key cryptography and digital signatures are
used to identify accounts and authorise transactions submitted
to a blockchain.
Problem: Using a single key for all transactions has serious
privacy implication for an identity owner since transactions
can be correlated to expose all the identities an entity holds.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
• Identifiability. An entity needs to create an identity for
sending transactions in the blockchain network.
• Re-identification. Each entity can have more than one
identities in the real world. For example, one person is
both a client of a bank and a patient of a hospital. If an
entity handles all the identities via a single key, its privacy
may be violated as all the transactions on blockchain are
transparent and can be correlated.
• Security. There is no a standard approach to protect or
recover users’ secret keys.
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Solution: Each entity can have a master-key to manage sub-
keys which are used for signing messages under different
identities. For example, a person can have a sub-key for the
student identity and another sub-key for the company intern
identity. Each sub-key is linked to a unique identifier and
stored as part of the identifier’s data in the identifier registry,
which can be updated using the master-key. The use of master-
key must be minimised (i.e., only used for controlling sub-
keys) due to its importance.
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Identifiability. Identifiability is preserved as each transac-
tion is signed by a private key.
• Privacy. Each sub-key maintains its own identity. The
transactions sent under different identities are less likely
to be mapped and correlated in order to re-identify the
user.
• Availability. If a sub-key is lost or compromised, the
master-key can be used to revoke the lost or compromised
key and update it with a new sub-key.
Drawbacks:
• Security. If the master-key is lost or compromised, the
identity owner loses control of all the sub-keys which
means loss of control of all the owned identities.
Related patterns:
• Hot & Cold Wallet Storage (Section III-A2) Entities’ keys
are stored in wallet applications.
• Key Sharding (Section III-A3) Keys can be protected and
recovered by Key Sharding.
• Identifier Registry (Section III-B1) Entities can use sub-
keys to register identifiers in Identifier Registry.
• Multiple Registration (Section III-B2) Sub-keys are used
to register identifiers for different identity relationships.
Known uses:
• uPort2 A uPort user interacts with application smart
contracts via a proxy smart contract, thus the public
key of the proxy contract is considered as a layer of
indirection between the users private key and the target
application contract.
• Ethereum7 Implementing the Ethereum ERC725 standard
key management functions8 requires the deployment of
ERC 725 identity smart contracts, which act as unique
identifiable proxy accounts and used by humans, groups,
organisations, objects and machines.
• Trinity9 Trinity is a wallet application of IOTA ledger10.
Each account has a seed acting as a master-key, to control
the addresses and IOTA tokens of that specific account.
2) Hot & Cold Wallet Storage:
Summary: An entity can maintain a hot wallet connecting to
internet and a cold wallet which is kept offline. Fig. 5 is a
graphical representation of the pattern.
Context: As a blockchain network participant, one entity can
rely on so-called “wallets” to manage its accounts and interact
with blockchain.
Problem: An entity’s wallet may suffer malicious attacks,
leading to key theft. The attacker can send transactions under
that entity’s name to blockchain using a compromised key.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
7https://ethereum.org/
8https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/725
9https://trinity.iota.org/
10https://www.iota.org/
Hot wallet
Blockchain network
Cold wallet
Fig. 5. Hot & Cold Wallet Storage Pattern
• Cyber security. A key may be hacked when being stored
in a device connected to internet.
• Usability. Some keys may be frequently used by
blockchain participants while other keys might act as
backup.
Solution: Users can choose to store keys in two types of
wallets, namely hot wallet and cold wallet. Hot wallet refers
to the blockchain gateways that are connected to Internet.
Through a hot wallet, a user is able to directly conduct
specific operations (e.g. generation) to its accounts and related
decentralised identifiers stored on-chain. Cold wallet refers
to key storage that is off-line, keeping the accounts from
being hacked. A cold wallet can be any device disconnected
from the internet or even a paper recording an entity’s keys.
When the keys stored in a cold wallet are required for signing
transactions, the user needs to connect the cold wallet device
to a computer and copy-paste the key in the relevant field. A
user can combine these two wallets: storing accounts that are
frequently used in a hot wallet while using a cold wallet to
keep those that are not used often.
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Secure storage. Cold wallets are separated from internet,
which provide secure storage for entities’ keys.
• Usability. Such a secure storage also preserves the usabil-
ity of keys, as once a cold wallet is connected to Internet,
an entity can utilize those keys.
Drawbacks:
• Security. Hot wallets store one’s secret keys on-line,
which is still vulnerable to theft.
• Usability. Cold wallets are more secure than hot wallets
but less convenient to use, as the user has to connect to
the cold wallet which might not be around.
Related patterns:
• Master & Sub key (Section III-A1) Wallet applications
are utilised to stored users’ keys.
• Key Sharding (Section III-A3) Splitting and recombining
a key should be conducted in a wallet application.
• Update by Delegates (Section III-B5) When being inte-
grated into wallet applications, predefined delegates can
replace key ownership if a key is compromised.
Known uses:
.
.
.
Private key 
piece 2
Private key 
piece N
Private key 
piece 1
Original private key
Fig. 6. Key Sharding Pattern
• MyEtherWallet11 Ethereum blockchain network offers a
software , MyEtherWallet, as hot wallet to users for in-
stant payment and withdrawal. With a visual interface, it
is easy for users to operate without inputting complicated
commands.
• Trezor12 Trezor is a cryptocurrency hardware wallet,
designed to store and encrypt users’ coins, passwords and
other digital keys. It is a single-purpose computer with
independent memory to save all private data.
• Ledger13 Ledger provides hardware wallet products to
stores users’ private keys in a secure hardware device,
protecting the cryptocurrencies.
3) Key Sharding:
Summary: A key can be split up into several different pieces,
and restored using enough key pieces. Fig. 6 is a graphical
representation of the pattern.
Context: In self-sovereign identity, a participant may have
multiple keys, for instance, signing key for transaction au-
thorisation, public/private key pair for encryption/decryption,
etc. Consequently, key management is significant to the users,
especially credential issuers and holders.
Problem: A user may lose or forget his/her secret keys under
some circumstances, e.g. the device containing the keys is lost
or broken. Losing the keys denotes that the owner could lose
control over its blockchain accounts in self-sovereign identity
and the related identities.
Forces:
• Loss of keys. Private keys are usually long and hard
to remember. Also, many blockchain platforms do not
provide a sound mechanism to recover the signing keys.
• Centralisation. A blockchain user’s keys are usually
stored in a wallet application installed on a mobile device,
and such a centralised approach to maintain keys may
cause a single-point of failure. Once the device is lost or
hacked, the user may lose the control of all keys.
Solution: To protect the security of a secret key, one can spilt
that key into several pieces as its requirement, and define a
11https://www.myetherwallet.com/
12https://trezor.io/
13https://www.ledger.com/
regrouping threshold. The key pieces can be kept in any way
the user prefers, e.g., wrote on a paper and locked in a safe
box, given to family and friends, etc. When a key is lost, the
user needs to regain enough key pieces (more than the preset
regrouping threshold), and these pieces can help rebuild the
complete key.
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Tolerance of lost key. A lost key can be recovered by its
shards, which provides great convenience to blockchain
users.
• Decentralisation. The shards are stored in a decentralised
way, which reduces the risk of losing all shards in an
attack.
• Flexibility. An entity does not have to input all but just
enough key shard when recombining a lost key.
Drawbacks:
• Cost. Maintaining key shards needs extra vigor. If a key
shard is lost, there is no way to restore it.
• Security. Having multiple key shards provides multiple
targets to attack.
Related patterns:
• Master & Sub Key (Section III-A1) Key Sharding is
applied to split and recombine entities’ keys.
• Hot & Cold Wallet Storage (Section III-A2) The key split-
ting and recombining functionalities should be integrated
into wallet applications.
• Update by Delegates (Section III-B5) Key Sharding can
restore a lost key, while Update by Delegates aims to
replace a compromised key with a new one.
Known uses:
• Parity14 For each private key of an account, Parity dis-
tributes 12-word phrase acting as an additional backup.
If a user loses the private key, this phrase can help fully
recover it.
• Crypto++15 A free and open-source C++ class library of
cryptographic algorithms and schemes, which implements
the Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme: spliting up a secret
into defined number of pieces, and restoring the original
secret when given enough secret pieces.
B. DID Management Patterns
1) Identifier Registry:
Summary: The identifier registry maintains bindings between
an identifier and the address of an identity attribute (e.g. name,
profile, picture). Fig. 7 is a graphical representation of the
pattern.
Context: Identity is defined as sets of attributes related to
an entity16. In software applications, identity attribute data
14https://www.parity.io/
15https://cryptopp.com/
16https://www.iso.org/standard/77582.html
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needs to be accessed for a specific purpose. An identifier is a
globally unique persistent series of digits and/or characters that
is used to uniquely identify an entity (e.g. human, organisation,
device) within one domain and can be used to retrieve the
storage location of the identity attribute data. A Decentralised
Identifier (DID) is a new type of identifier which is designed
for cryptographically verifiable self-sovereign identity.
Problem: In traditional centralised software systems, map-
pings between an identifier and the identity data storage
location is maintained by a centralised single authority which
may become a potential single point of failure.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
• Upgradability. The need to upgrade identity data over
time is ultimately necessary for software applications.
• Scalability. Blockchain provides limited scalability be-
cause data is replicated across all nodes and kept per-
manently.
• Cost. Storing data to blockchain may have monetary cost
(if choosing a public blockchain), and also occupies the
physical storage of all participating nodes.
Solution: Implementing an identifier registry designed as a
smart contract to maintain bindings between an identifier and
the location of associated off-chain identity data attributes.
This identifier registry smart contract is the main entry point
for accessing the attributes of an identity, which can map each
identifier to a storage (e.g. IPFS, Dropbox, etc.) location for
the respective identity attributes (e.g. an IPFS hash linking
to the IPFS storage location containing the user’s identity
attributes). Only the identifier owner is allowed to update the
storage location of identity attributes. Each identifier points to
an identifier document which describes how to use that specific
identifier, e.g. public keys used for digital signatures, service
endpoints for interaction.
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Upgradability. Through the cryptographic access controls
built into the blockchain, it is guaranteed that only the
owner of the identity (i.e. the key owner) has the right to
modify the data reference in identifier registry.
• Scalability. The data structure of identifier registry is
simple and lightweight, which only stores identifiers and
locations of identity attributes.
• Cost. If a public blockchain is used, the cost is low since
the data size of identifiers and identity storage locations
is fixed.
Drawbacks:
• Integrity. The off-chain identity data store might not be
as secure as blockchain. The raw data may be changed
without authorisation. If IPFS is used for identity data
storage, the change will be detected. However, without
additional measures, it will neither be possible to recover
the original data nor to prevent the change from happen-
ing in the first place.
• Data loss. Since the raw data is stored off-chain, it may
be deleted or lost.
Related patterns:
• Multiple Registration (Section III-B2) An entity can reg-
ister multiple identifiers at once in Identifier Registry.
• Bound with Social Media (Section III-B3) Identifier Reg-
istry maintains the mapping between an entity’s on-chain
identity and social media.
• Dual Resolution (Section III-B4) Entities resolve each
other’s identifiers in Identifier Registry.
• Update by Delegates (Section III-B5) Predefined dele-
gates can change the binding key of a compromised
identifier.
• Master & Sub Key (Section III-A1) Entities register
identifiers in Identifier Registry through their sub-keys.
• Content-Addressable Storage Pattern [19] Identifier Reg-
istry is similar to Content-Addressable Storage Pattern,
storing raw data off-chain while publishing a reference
in smart contract.
• Flyweight Pattern [20] Identifier Registry and Flyweight
Pattern both include a registry to maintain the mapping
of identifiers and the respective reference pointing to off-
chain data.
Known uses:
• uPort2 The registry contract maintains mappings between
a uPort identifier and an IPFS hash linking to a data
structure storing an entity’s attributes.
• Sovrin17 Sovrin offers a registry for decentralised identi-
fiers and the associated public keys and communications
endpoints. The operations (i.e. registration, update, reso-
lution, and revocation) are all determined by the Sovrin
protocol.
• Jolocom18 Jolocom distributed identity system integrates
Ethereum blockchain and Interplanetary File System
(IPFS). A deployed smart contract maintains the mapping
from a DID to the corresponding DDO stored in IPFS.
2) Multiple Registration:
Summary: Each entity can register a unique identifier for
every relationship (i.e. every identity) they have. Fig. 8 is a
graphical representation of the pattern.
17https://sovrin.org/
18https://jolocom.io/
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Context: An identifier is used to uniquely identify an entity
and to retrieve the identity attribute data.
Problem: Sending all transactions using a single identifier
has serious privacy implication for an entity since these
transactions can be correlated to expose all the identities this
entity holds.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
• Transparency. All the historical transactions on
blockchain can be accessed by every participant
within the same blockchain network. The transactions
on a public blockchain are also accessible to everyone
on the internet.
• Security. There is no standard approach to protect or
recover users’ secret keys.
Solution: Each entity can establish a unique identifier for
every relationship (i.e. every identity) they have, which allows
keeping interactions with one entity entirely separate from any
other entity. For example, the relationship a person builds
with a hospital is completely separate to the one that is
established with a university. Neither the hospital nor the
university could proactively use the identifiers to correlate this
person’s activities.
Consequences: Benefits:
• Privacy. This pattern tackles with the nature transparency
of blockchain to some extent, as an entity’s activities in
different identity relationships can hardly be correlated.
• Availability. The loss of signing key of one identifier does
not affect the other identifiers.
Drawbacks:
• Cost. Compared to a single identifier, multiple identifiers
cost more for identifier registration and updates.
Related patterns:
• Identifier Registry (Section III-B1) Registered identifiers
are stored in Identifier Registry.
• Master & Sub Key (Section III-A1) Entities use different
sub-keys to conduct Multiple Registration.
Known uses:
• Sovrin17 Sovrin suggests users to use a separate identifier
for every relationship. Consequently, if a relationship suf-
fers a breach and the identifier is compromised, the user
can still have normal interactions in other relationships.
• Blockstack19 Blockstack allows entities to create as many
identities as they want. Each identity is represented by
an identifier and a secret key. Entities can utilise their
identities to sign in different decentralised applications.
• DAML20 In DAML ledger, participant nodes can use
human-readable strings as identifiers to identify them-
selves. A real-world entity is able to possess multiple
identifiers in the same ledger network to denote different
identities.
3) Bound With Social Media:
Summary: A bidirectional binding is established between
social media profile and blockchain-based identity. Fig. 9 is a
graphical representation of the pattern.
Social media post
URL: https://…
did:0x2...student
...
0x2222… DDO
owner: 0x1111…
id:did:0x2...student
socialMedia: https://...
...
On-chainOff-chain
DDO stored in identifier 
registry smart contract
Social media post of 
on-chain identity
Fig. 9. Bound With Social Media Pattern
Context: Social media profiles can be considered as one of
the most important assets, which are critical to achieve more
exposure on the internet, attract more attention, or improve
online reputation. The trustworthiness of a social media profile
can be improved by verifying the account using traditional
identity issued by some central authority. On the other hand,
blockchain provides a decentralised infrastructure for self-
sovereign identity, where entities are in control over their
own identities. To ensure the trustworthiness, some identity
blockchains (e.g. Hyperledger Indy) are designed as public
permissioned blockchains, which are governed by a group of
participants.
Problem: In addition to verification by some certain people or
central authorities, a user can link his/her social media profile
(e.g. Twitter) to his/her identity registered on blockchain to
improve the trustworthiness of both social media profile and
blockchain-based identity. The problem here is how to bind a
social media profile with the corresponding blockchain-based
identity to ensure mapping.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
• Authoritative source. A 1-to-1 mapping is required be-
tween a social media account and its corresponding
blockchain-based identity.
19https://blockstack.org/
20https://daml.com/
• Security. The mapping needs to be stored securely from
tampering.
• Verified accounts. Social media applications verify ac-
counts via traditional identity documents.
Solution: An entity can create an attribute of social media
in the identifier document. Signing the attribute with the
blockchain signing key creates a claim that the blockchain-
based identity controls the social media account. The attribute
also contains a URL which links to a social media post stating
that the social media account also controls this particular
blockchain identity. Thus, a two-way link is established for
connecting the blockchain identity with the social media
profile. The two directional binding makes sure that that the
social media profile and blockchain-based identity have a 1-
to-1 mapping.
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Authoritative source. The trustworthiness of social me-
dia account and blockchain-based identity can both be
improved by binding them together.
• Secure storage. Blockchain provides a secure data store
through distributed ledger technology.
• Verified accounts. A social media verifies the legal iden-
tity of a user.
Drawbacks:
• Trustworthiness. The trustworthiness of social media ac-
count relies on the verification process while the the
trustworthiness of blockchain-based identity depends on
the trustworthiness of trusted participants.
Related patterns:
• Identifier Registry (Section III-B1) Identifier Registry
maintains the mapping of an entity’s on-chain identity
and social media.
Known uses:
• Onename21 Onename is a registrar for Blockstack which
is a decentralised naming and storage system. With One-
name, a user can easily register a blockchain ID and cre-
ate corresponding profile on Blockstack, and completely
has control of his/her blockchain ID and profile. Users
can can link their Blockstack profiles with existing online
social media accounts (Twitter, Facebook, Github, etc),
and also embed their blockchain ID on their social media
posts.
4) Dual Resolution:
Summary: To establish interactions, two entities can mutually
acquire each other’s DDO to access information necessary
for verification (e.g., public key) and communication (e.g.,
service endpoints for provided services). Fig. 10 is a graphical
representation of the pattern.
Context: In self-sovereign identity, entities interact with each
other.
21https://www.onename.com/
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Fig. 10. Dual Resolution Pattern
Problem: When two or more entities want to establish inter-
actions (e.g., for business purposes), each entity first needs to
determine the target entity’s basic information and ways of
communicating before going further.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
• Interoperability. For two parties to interact, the ways of
communication have to be interoperable.
• Independence. The interacting entities should remain in-
dependent of each other and one should not be able to
pry on the other.
Solution: A DDO contains verification methods (i.e. public
keys) and service endpoints (e.g., messaging service details)
which can be utilised by an entity to establish interactions
with the corresponding DID owner. Before any formal activ-
ity between two entities in a relationship, they should first
mutually resolve each other’s DID and obtain the interaction
information stored in DDO. Such a process is considered as
“Dual Resolution” and it forms the first step for any entity to
establish an interoperation with its target entity.
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Interoperability. The Dual Resolution process allows the
interacting entities in a relationship to obtain and check
each other’s basic information on verification and services
provided for interoperability.
• Independence. Each DDO stores necessary interaction
information only for its corresponding DID, hence, an
entity’s different identities are independent from each
other and cannot be correlated.
Drawbacks:
• Privacy. It is possible for an entity to store in DDO extra
information about itself other than what is necessary for
communication, such as social media accounts, personal
websites. Doing so may increase the trustworthiness of
the entity as more identity information is shared with oth-
ers. However, this also increases the risk of unwillingly
revealing the entity’s personal information.
Related patterns:
• Identifier Registry (Section III-B1) Entities resolve each
other’s identifiers in Identifier Registry.
Known uses: The existing self-sovereign identity applications
do not directly point out this feature as a provided functional-
ity, but the users need to resolve each other’s DID when there
is potential interaction.
5) Update by Delegates:
Summary: Each identifier maintains a list of delegates that
can help the user recover the identity. Fig. 11 is a graphical
representation of the pattern.
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Fig. 11. Update By Delegates Pattern
Context: Each identity has a key pair to authenticate the trans-
actions initiated by the user by means of digital signatures.
Problem: A master-key may be compromised/stolen by mali-
cious hackers. A compromised master-key results in the loss of
ownership over all sub-keys and corresponding identifiers. The
hacker may utilise the identifiers to further steal the entity’s
identity data.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
• Compromised private key. Authentication can be achieved
by using digital signatures. Currently, many blockchain
platforms do not provide a sound mechanism to recover
compromised keys, thus key theft results in permanent
loss of control over related identifiers.
• Non-reusability. A compromised identity can be claimed
of no more use, but its owner has to spent extra time,
money, and energy to re-register a new identifier and
rebuild all corresponding relationships.
Solution: Update by Delegates relies on a web of trust archi-
tecture. This requires an identity owner to designate its own set
of trustees that the owner trusts to assist in identity ownership
update when the owner asks for it. An identifier maintains a
list of recovery delegates and an update threshold that can help
the user recover identity. These delegates can be individuals
(such as family members or friends) or organisations (such as
banks). If key loss happens, the original identity owner needs
to request for ownership update using a new key pair, and a
minimum number of the trustees (e.g. 2 out of 3) must sign
a new identity record transaction respectively. When there are
enough confirmations (i.e. reaching the threshold) of the new
key pair, the ownership of the identifier is updated and thus
the identity is recovered. A timelock period can be specified
to prevent an attacker who tries to compromise an identity
owner’s key and immediately change the owner’s identity
records, including his/her designated trustees to prevent iden-
tifier ownership recovery.
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Tolerance of compromised private key. This pattern can
guarantee security by maintaining a group of delegates
who can confirm a new key proposed by the identity
owner to replace the compromised key, improving the
tolerance of key compromise.
• Reusability. The ownership of a compromised identity can
be recovered and then put into use again, which mitigates
the burden of rebuilding another same identity.
Drawbacks:
• Cost. Recovering an identity requires setting up a delegate
list in advance, and sending update requests/votes after
the identity is compromised. Each operation sends a
transaction to blockchain.
Related patterns:
• Identifier Registry (Section III-B1) Delegates related to a
specific identifier are stored in Identifier Registry.
• Hot & Cold Wallet Storage (Section III-A2) When being
integrated into wallet applications, predefined delegates
can replace key ownership if a key is compromised.
• Key Sharding (Section III-A3) Key Sharding can restore
a lost key, while Update by Delegates aims to replace a
compromised key with a new one.
• Multiple Authorisation [13] Update by Delegates is de-
rived from Multiple Authorisation that the change of a
lost secret key in a DID requires enough confirmation.
• Mutex Pattern [21] Mutex Pattern can be applied to
Update by Delegates, ensuring that no any other operation
can be conducted within an update procedure.
Known uses:
• uPort2 In uPort, the user’s mobile device is the only place
where stores the private key that controls a uPortID. To
avoid the key loss issue caused by loss or theft of the
mobile devices, users must nominate a group of delegates
who can vote to replace the public key. Once a quorum is
achieved by the delegates on the newly proposed public
key, the lost public key is replaced with the new public
key.
• Sovrin17 Similar to uPort, Sovrin provides a key recovery
mechanism for key recovery that relies on the user
selecting a group of delegates. When the user requests
the delegates to assist key recovery, a specified quorum
of delegates must sign a new identity record transaction
that validator nodes must verify.
• Baidu Cloud22 Baidu implemented its SSI solution via
Quorum, an Ethereum-based DLT. In each user’s DDO, a
“recovery” attribute defines a list of public keys to recover
the on-chain identity.
C. Credential Design Patterns
1) Selective Content Generation:
Summary: An issuer generates a customised credential ac-
cording to a holder’s specific requirements about credential
contents. Fig. 12 is a graphical representation of the pattern.
issuer did: did:uBaaS:0x11…
holder did: did:uBaaS:0x22…
name: John Smith
DOB:
age: above 18
country: Australia
job: student
address:
...
Fig. 12. Selective Content Generation Pattern
Context: A verifier requires certain information to prove a
holder’s identity, thus, a holder only needs to share a credential
with necessary data to the verifer.
Problem: If issuers publish general credentials to holders, a
verifier can learn all identity data involved when only some
particular attributes are needed. For instance, if a person shows
his/her ID to identify the age, his/her address is presented
either. This may cause data leak as extra information is
provided.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
• Privacy. The disclosed credential should contain mini-
mum amount of data necessary to identify some certain
aspects of its holder.
• Specific requirements. Each verifier may have specific
requirements on inspecting a holder’s identity facts.
Solution: Selective Content Generation allows issuers to de-
cide what identity attributes are contained in a credential. An
issued credential needs to satisfy the target verifier’s specific
requirements of holder’s identity, without revealing extra data.
A credential with selective content disclosure can be generated
via the following approaches23.
• Atomic credentials. An issuer generates multiple creden-
tials and each one only contains exactly one identity
attribute about the holder. Consequently, the holder can
flexibly disclose those required credentials to a verifier.
• Selective disclosure signatures. A general credential is
issued to a holder, but some special signature schemes
(e.g. Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures) allow them to
only reveal necessary information.
22https://cloud.baidu.com/
23https://w3c.github.io/vc-imp-guide/
• Hashed values. A general credential consists of multiple
identity attributes, but each one is hashed with different
nonce. When verifying a credential, a verifier can only
validate those with the actual values provided by the
holder, but cannot determine other hashed values.
• Zero-knowledge proof. When proving certain identity
attributes, a holder can protect its information by giving
a range instead of precise value (e.g., age is over 18).
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Data minimisation. A credential with selective content
can disclose the identity data which satisfy the verifier’s
individual requests while keeping other identity data
private.
Drawbacks:
• Cost. Determining the identity data within a credential
requires additional communication between holders and
verifiers for learning the verification requirements, and
between holders and issuers for discussing the credential
content. Moreover, maintaining multiple credentials with
different contents can incur extra costs.
Related patterns:
• Time-Constrained Access (Section III-C2) Selective Con-
tent Generation can work collaboratively with Time-
Constrained Access, to generate credentials with fine-
grained specifications.
• One-Off Access (Section III-C3) Selective Content Gener-
ation can also work collaboratively with One-Off Access,
to generate credentials with fine-grained specifications.
• Anchoring to Blockchain (Section III-C4) Off-chain cre-
dential contents need to be hashed and stored on-chain
to preserve integrity.
Known uses:
• uPort2 A uPort user encrypts identity attributes using a
symmetric encryption key before disclosure. The sym-
metric encryption key is then individually encrypted using
a public encryption key owned by the other interacting
party.
• Sovrin17 A cryptographic technique known as a zero-
knowledge proof is utilised in Sovrin. A verifier can
check the authentication of an identity though the public
key of the issuer, but never learns the actual data.
2) Time-Constrained Access:
Summary: A holder can share a link which is redirected to the
credential content only for a restricted accessible time period.
The verifier can only access the credential content within the
determined time period. Fig. 13 is a graphical representation
of the pattern.
Context: Usually an identification process lasts for a certain
time period. After proving the identity of an entity, the
presented credential has accomplished its mission and should
not be accessed again.
issuer did: did:uBaaS:0x11…
holder did: did:uBaaS:0x22…
credential id: example123…
creation date: 08/20/2019
valid period: 30 days
name: John Smith
age: above 18
country: Australia
...
Fig. 13. Time-Constrained Access Pattern
Problem: After receiving a credential, a verifier then has the
ability to access, read, and verify certain identity data of the
holder. If the credential is long-term or even permanently
effective, the verifier then can verify the credential after current
identification process, which means that it can still access and
check the holder’s identity data when there is not a legitimate
permission for proving the identity, resulting identity data leak.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
• Privacy. A holder’s identity information should not be ac-
cessed or verified when the current identification process
is finished.
• Inflexibility. Verifiers have their own identification pro-
cesses, which may take different amounts of time. The
cost to generate and maintain credentials for the process
inconsistency is huge.
Solution: A holder is able to generate an identifiable link, and
define its accessible period (e.g. certain days). The link can
redirect to a page presenting credential content. Afterwards,
the holder can share the time-constrained link to verifiers
instead of the original credential itself. Within the predefined
accessible period, a verifier can visit and verify the credential
for identification without limit. Nevertheless, when the link
is expired, there is no approach for the verifier to obtain
credential content again.
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Privacy. A holder can determine the accessible period
of a shared link, which ensures that the holder’s identity
information can only be fetched within a particular identi-
fication process. An expired credential cannot be verified
again. Consequently, a malicious verifier is unable to
further utilised the identity data.
• Flexibility. Shared links does not affect the original cre-
dential. Consequently, this pattern can be flexibly applied
to a long-term effective credential, links with different
accessible periods can be sent to different verifiers.
Drawbacks:
• Cost. Storing the credential replicas requires more stor-
age.
• Privacy. A malicious verifier may take a photo of the
credential when accessing it, then it has the credential
content even if the shared link is expired. Although the
compromised credential cannot reveal up-to-date infor-
mation of the holder, the attacker still maintains historical
identity attributes of the holder to some extent.
Related patterns:
• Selective Content Generation (Section III-C1) Time-
Constrained Access can work collaboratively with Se-
lective Content Generation, to generate credentials with
fine-grained specifications.
• One-Off Access (Section III-C3) One-Off Access can be
seen as a derivative of Time-Constrained Access under an
extreme condition.
Known uses:
• Snapchat24 Snapchat is a social media in which users
can share their photos and videos. Every shared photo or
video is automatically deleted after a certain amount of
time.
• Snappass25 Snappass is a website where users can gen-
erate secret information and share it by URL. A user can
set a valid time period to each secret, within which the
secret information can be read.
3) One-Off Access:
Summary: A holder can share a “one-off” link which is
redirected to the credential content one time only. This may
be used to satisfy a temporary identification request. Fig. 14
is a graphical representation of the pattern.
issuer did: did:uBaaS:0x11…
holder did: did:uBaaS:0x22…
credential id: example123…
creation date: 08/20/2019
name: John Smith
age: above 18
country: Australia
...
Fig. 14. One-Off Access Pattern
Context: A verifier does not require a long-term effective
credential but only needs to check the identity of a holder
once for a specific purpose.
Problem: Sometimes an identification process does not require
a strict verification procedure, but only needs to check the
identity for once. For instance, travelling by train/airplane
or going to a theme park only asks for checking credentials
before entering. If a holder presents a long-term effective link
redirecting to the credential content, a malicious verifier may
access the holder’s data illegally after identification process.
This can be considered as an extreme version of Time-
Constrained Access.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
24https://www.snapchat.com/
25https://oneoffsecret.com/
• Privacy. A holder’s identity information should not be ac-
cessed or verified when the current identification process
is finished.
• Inflexibility. Using a long-term effective credential to
satisfy a temporary credential request is not appropriate,
as the holder cannot control the access to this credential
after the temporary request.
Solution: A holder is able to generate an identifiable link,
which redirects to a one-off page presenting the credential
content. One-off links can be shared with verifiers on some
special occasions. After being visited once, the link becomes
invalid that no one can use it to access the credential content.
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Privacy. The identity attributes presented via one-off links
can only be read and verified for once. Similar to Time-
Constrained Access, malicious verifiers cannot further
violate holders’ privacy via expired links. Information
within the link becomes unauthentic as there is no ap-
proach to verify it.
• Flexibility. One-Off Access defines an extremely short
period to visit the credential content, satisfying temporary
identification requests.
Drawbacks:
• Privacy. A malicious verifier may take a photo of the
credential when accessing it, then it can read the content
even if the one-off link is expired. Although information
within an expired link can no longer be used to prove
anything, this still can cause a privacy issue for the holder.
Related patterns:
• Selective Content Generation (Section III-C1) One-Off
Access can work collaboratively with Selective Content
Generation, to generate credentials with fine-grained
specifications.
• Time-Constrained Access (Section III-C2) One-Off Ac-
cess can be seen as a derivative of Time-Constrained
Access under an extreme condition.
Known uses:
• Snapchat24 Snapchat can automatically delete user-
uploaded photos or videos when once read, according
to the user’s setting.
• Snappass25 In Snappass, user-defined secret information
are delete and cannot be recovered after being read for
once.
4) Anchoring to Blockchain:
Summary: Instead of storing everything on-chain, one can
periodically send the unique hash value of off-chain data to
blockchain. Fig. 15 is a graphical representation of the pattern.
Context: Blockchain’s nature configurations may limit its
performance when facing a large number of transactions.
Problem: Blockchain can ensure data integrity via storing data
on-chain, but it costs real money to process the transaction in
Off-chain data hashing
On-chainOff-chain
Fig. 15. Anchoring to Blockchain Pattern
many public blockchain networks. In addition, according to
the nature consensus mechanism, blockchain generates a block
in a fixed period (i.e. block interval), which only includes
a restricted number of transactions due to the block size.
Consequently, blockchain’s performance may be restricted
when users frequently initiate transactions.
Forces: The problem requires balancing the following forces:
• Cost. In a permissionless blockchain network, sending a
transaction charges real money, thus, frequently storing
data to blockchain is expensive. Even in a permissioned
blockchain, each full node maintains a local replica of all
historical transactions, handling plenty of transactions is
also costly for physical storage.
• Scalability. Blockchain has nature performance restriction
that within a block interval, only a limited number of
transactions can be processed while others need to wait in
the transaction pool. Utilising blockchain to record every
data change may result in the accumulation of waiting
transactions in the pool.
Solution: Anchoring to blockchain relies on the hashing
technology that one does not need to store everything on-chain,
but periodically sends the unique hash value of off-chain data
to blockchain.
Consequences:
Benefits:
• Cost. Anchoring reduces the cost of applying blockchain
in terms of monetary payment and physical storage, as
there are less transactions sent to blockchain.
• Scalability. Anchoring keeps complex and tedious busi-
ness processes off-chain, which enhances the scalability
of blockchain-based systems that blockchain only needs
to record the hash values of all kinds of data and files.
• Opacity. Blockchain transactions are immutable and can
be view by all participants. Thus, storing hash values
rather than original information can preserve data privacy.
Drawbacks:
• Opacity. Hash values are neither human-readable or can
be restored into original files, which means that using
anchoring may affect the transparency and auditability of
on-chain data.
Related patterns:
• Selective Content Generation (Section III-C1) Off-chain
credential contents need to be hashed and stored on-chain
to preserve integrity.
• Off-Chain Data Storage [13] Anchoring to Blockchain
works similarly as Off-Chain Data Storage, calculating
the hash of raw off-chain and storing the hash values
on-chain.
• Low Contract Footprint Pattern [19] Anchoring to
Blockchain works similarly as Low Contract Footprint
Pattern, which concerns about the monetary cost and
optimises the writing operations to blockchain.
Known uses:
• Blockstack19 Blockstack allows entities to register off-
chain decentralised identifiers. To prove the existence
of these off-chain identifiers, the system collects hashes
of corresponding files and writes the hash values to
blockchain.
• Chainpoint26 Chainpoint is an open standard for creating
a timestamp proof of any data, file, or process by gener-
ating a Merkle Tree, and publishing root of this tree to
the Bitcoin blockchain.
• Laava A blockchain-based system may need to serve
different tenants simultaneously, who are not willing
to expose private data to each other. Researchers from
Data61 and Laava ID Pty. Ltd. designed a scalable
platform architecture for multitenant blockchain-based
systems [32], in which every tenant has an individual
permissioned blockchain to maintain their own data,
while all tenant chains are anchored into a main chain
periodically.
IV. CONCLUSION
We view blockchain as a fundamental component of large-
scale decentralised software systems. In self-sovereign iden-
tity, blockchain provides an underlying computing infrastruc-
ture and decentralised pseudonym mechanism. In this paper,
we summarise and propose 12 different design patterns as-
sociated with the lifecycles of three main objects (i.e. key,
decentralised identifier, and credential) in blockchain-based
self-sovereign identity. The pattern collection is considered as
a guidance for architects to better design blockchain-based
self-sovereign identity systems.
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